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know what they are assuming because no other way of
putting things has ever occurred to them."
Unexamined premises are always dangerous. The
neglect of values in the university context is particularly dangerous since it invites a narrow specialization
and focus of concern that is destructive of the balanced wholeness of the good life. Academics need to
be more open, more critical, and more creative about
the value aspects of the educational process.
Professional training in a law school provides a
good example of the need and the problem. The unarticulated (and usually unexamined) value system of
legal education in the United States today involves the
following ingredients: a skeptical attitude toward
generalizations; an instrumental approach to knowledge (i.e., knowledge aimed at immediate practical
results); an emphasis on tough-minded analysis; and
a faith that man, by the application of his reason and
the use of democratic processes, can make the world a
better place.
There is much to be said for the utility of this intellectual framework for the practicing lawyer. It is part
of the powerful forces of secularism that, starting
with an emphasis on cognitive rationality and utilizing
the methods of science and applied technology, have
routed superstition and fixed status, and resulted in a
more open society in which individual choice and a
more abundant life are possible.
A skeptical attitude toward generalizations, principles, and rules is a desirable attribute of a competent lawyer. But skepticism that deepens to a belief in
the meaninglessness of principles, the relativism of
values, or the nonexistence of an ultimate reality is
crippling and dangerous. One example is the nowcommonplace (but erroneous) notion that there is an
unbridgeable chasm between facts, which are "real"
or "hard" or "tangible," and values, which are "subjective" or "soft" or "intangible." This notion leads to
a neglect of values, which are viewed either as personal preferences ("you can't argue about values") or
as the product of social conditioning ("the real determinant is childhood sexual experiences"-or "class
interests" or whatnot). Tendencies toward moral
relativism and value nihilism are pervasive in the
modern university, leaving students troubled and anxious about the self-centered Playboy philosophy that
dominates much of student culture.
One of the consequences of a skeptical age is that
all the heroes are killed off one by one. Law is no exception. The great men of American law in recent
times-Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, and the likecome off poorly in the critical atmosphere of the law
classroom. Their wisdom is seen as partial, their decisions frequently short-sighted or wrong, and their
greatness is blurred.
Yet the young professional hungers for mature professionals on which he can model his conduct. In certain aspects of thinking and feeling-such as careful
use of language, cognitive rationality, and a skeptical
attitude-law teachers may serve as models. But they
Adapted by permissionfrom the Cornell Law Forum (Vol. 4, No.
2), October 1977.

have forsaken the profession that the law student
plans to enter, and their attitude toward practitioners
is often touched with an air of superiority and disdain.
Inevitably there is a "do as I say not as I do" problem
for a law student viewing a law teacher as a model.
CONFRONTED WITH TWO EXTREMES
Law school tends to present two abstract models of
professional conduct to law students: the hired gun
and the social engineer. Both are consistent with the
instrumental approach to law, and both are specialists
in persuasion and manipulation.
The role of the hired gun forces the potential lawyer
to visualize himself as an intellectual prostitute. In
law school he is asked to argue both sides of many
issues. It is common for a student to respond to the
question "How do you come out on this case?" with
the revealing reply "It depends on what side I'm on."
If the lawyer is going to live with himself, the system
seems to say, he can't worry too much about right and
wrong. Many sensitive students are deeply troubled by
the moral implications of this role, and law school
generally provides little help in resolving the problem.
The social engineer is a technician who deals with
issues and interests rather than individuals. This role
implies a somewhat lifeless concern with the details of
a technical and bureaucratic world and a givenness of
the values that the social engineer is attempting to implement. But it also implies a tunnel vision that filters
out a large portion of human experience. As Robert
Bellah has said, "Modern secularism, while releasing
human beings from one kind of tyranny, often imposed a new, more terrible tyranny, however-the
tyranny of the pragmatic world of every day, of the
givenness of immediate reality with all its constraints.
It has resulted in the rise of the bureaucratic, technological, and manipulative man, who rejects all transcendence, who has what Blake called 'single vision.'
There is something deeply demonic in the single vision
of modern secular consciousness with the vast range of
human experience that it tends to shut out."
The sharing, helping and serving aspects of human
endeavor, especially important to future professionals, are left largely untouched by the law school experience. Some observers comment that law students
become more isolated, suspicious, and verbally aggressive as they progress through law school; their aptitude for verbal articulation increases, but they rarely
stop to listen to others. If so, will they be good counselors? Will they need to unlearn a number of things
in order to operate successfully as professionals?
There was a time when the deficiencies of legal education could be compensated for by the breadth and
depth of liberal education. I fear, however, that the
deficiencies of legal education are now increasingly
characteristic of university education generally enormous emphasis on cognitive rationality, inculcation of
skeptical attitudes, an instrumental approach toward
knowledge and an avoidance of value questions.
Greater attention to the value questions implicit in the
professional role was always desirable; it is even more
so in an era in which higher education is pervaded by
a narrow emphasis on knowledge and rationality as
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tools for the control or manipulation of people.
FLAWS IN A LEGAL EDUCATION
Legal education in a university setting is a relatively
new phenomenon in the United States. The three-year
law program was first developed at Harvard at the end
of the nineteenth century, whence it spread to other
schools. A college degree as a requirement for admission to law school was a development of the first half
of this century. It was not until after World War II
that the number of American lawyers trained in law
schools finally passed the number trained by the apprenticeship route that has now virtually passed out of
existence.
This historical evolution, and especially the success
of large-class, case method teaching, has left its stamp
on contemporary legal education. First, although a
baccalaureate degree is required for admission, legal.
education has a closer resemblance in many important respects (large average class size, standardized
curriculum, competitive atmosphere, emphasis on
development of basic analytical skills, etc.) to undergraduate than to graduate education. A relatively
small group of faculty teach a fairly large number of
students in a manner that is reasonably efficient but
contains only limited provision for individual work,
specialized programs, or practical experience. Despite
the best efforts of law deans and faculties, legal education continues to be graduate education on the
cheap.
Second, the tension between the university environment, with its emphasis on the development of new
knowledge through research and scholarship, and the
legal profession, with its desire for a stream of highly
qualified professionals, has been resolved for the most
part in favor of a strong professional orientation. Only
a handful of law schools in the United States make a
substantial contribution to the creation of new knowledge about law and legal institutions. Law students
tend to view the scholarly interests of law teachers as a
diversion from or obstacle to their efforts to prepare
themselves-frequently in a too-short-sighted wayfor professional practice.
Third, although American law schools do a magnificent job in fostering a related group of cognitive
skills ("thinking like a lawyer") and in conveying
basic information about the legal system, they do not
produce a graduate fully qualified to practice law.
The assumption has been that the law graduate will
round out his legal and interpersonal skills during a
period of apprenticeship in a law office. Only limited
attention is given in law school to the integration of
skills, knowledge and attitudes that are necessary to
operate as a professional in handling the sensitive and
difficult problems of an actual client.
The major directions of movement in legal education in recent years flow directly from the shortcomings implicit in this brief analysis of the general
characteristics of legal education. First, efforts have
been made to infuse many of the virtues of graduate
education into legal education. Expansion of faculty
size at many schools has permitted a vast increase in
the total number of upper-class elective courses, intro-

duction of problem courses or seminars that provide
more intensive research and writing experiences to law
students and some development of specialized programs, such as programs in international legal
studies, law and economics, and the like.
The results have been beneficial, but the proliferation of the curriculum has been ungainly. The law
curriculum tends to grow by accretion and fragmentation, which provide additional choice to students
without interfering with entrenched faculty interests.
The resulting curriculum is not unified by a coherent
theory but is held together, if at all, by the unwillingness to depart from a common set of first-year
courses, traditional ever since established by Langdell
at Harvard in the 1890s, and by student persistence in
electing courses that are either tested on state bar examinations or viewed as bread-and-butter courses.
Second, law schools have attempted to justify their
presence in the university setting by encouraging
scholarship by faculty members, by building bridges
to disciplines, such as economics, history, government
and philosophy, that share some common interests
and by introducing policy science and perspective
courses into the law school.
The research product of law schools has taken a
quantum leap, but the effects on law students and the
law curriculum have been more limited. Empirical
research generally has proved too costly for the limited
resources of the law schools. Heavy teaching loads and
the pull of the profession, which offers attractive consulting, speaking and law reform activities, leave
faculty little time for research and scholarship. And
law students have not seized the opportunities available to them for more intellectual fare, as distinct
from courses that appeared to have greater short-run
utility to the practitioner. Thus no law school has been
willing to require law students to acquire a basic
understanding of the modern decision-making techniques of economics and the policy sciences even
though there is a general recognition that nearly all
sophisticated lawyers will have to deal with these techniques in the years ahead.
Third, a widespread recognition that legal education has concentrated in too single-minded a fashion
on certain cognitive skills and neglected other aspects of professional competence (skill in negotiating
conciliating, interviewing, litigating, etc., as well as
the ability to handle the emotional aspects of various
professional roles) has led law schools to focus increased attention on the competencies required of the
"compleat" lawyer.
Many law graduates are not exposed to good apprenticeship experiences, and even the portion that
receive high-quality supervision in the initial years of
practice benefit from an earlier introduction to a
clinical model of high-quality lawyer behavior (the
analogy to clinical training in medicine is apparent).
A clinical experience, involving actual or simulated
client representation, advances professional competence, sets standards for future professional performance and energizes the student's interest in law
study.
(Please turn to page 54)
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stop, a unit incapable of moral choice and thus of
meaning.
This is not, by the way, the same thing as saying
that man is trivial, with an almost infinitesimal life
span in an almost infinite universe. Trivial is something; to be totally caused is to be nothing. This idea
does not get full expression till well past the midpoint
of the piece but it colors everything. It explains the
beginning sections about the curse of consciousnesshow can you take out after someone who injures you,
when you understandboth the attack and your counterattack to mean nothing. You're a couple of puppets
set bumping into each other by the accidents of stage
design. Man cannot injure and insult you if you
understand nature's ultimate insult: that your behavior is nothing more than a fact.
His idea of the meaninglessness of factual man is
also closely connected with his recurring references to
man's wildness. Man is conscious of the possibility
that he means nothing, and strikes out wildly, in purposefully irrational behavior, destructive of self or
others, raging around in his prison of fact trying to
persuade himself that he means something. To quote
our hero, "whipping yourself may be very reactionary,

but it's better than nothing."
This raging is one of the things that destroys
utopias, assuming that we can stay interested in their
trivial materialistic advantages when confronted with
our nothingness. But the raging is more important
than that. Because it is, after all, in a determined
world, pointless, and so, far from freeing man from
his servitude, may simply be one of the bars. Yet it
reflects man's ultimate refusal to accept the fact of his
nothingness.
The ultimate acceptance of life is the Notes themselves. Why is he writing at all, he asks himself, and
for whom? He knows that he's sending out bleak
messages of pain, evil, irrationality and the total
pointlessness of communication. But he also knows
that he's sending out the message in a form that is
brilliant, vital, often wildly funny and wonderfully exuberant. How can he justify writing that his writing is
not justified-and with so much gusto? "Well," he
says, "why not? There's something more impressive
about it ... it will be in better style."

So now I'll give my answer about what the humanities can bring to law. As I said before, "only style";
&
but that may be all there is.

LIBERATING
(Continuedfrom page 7)
These are some of the benefits jurisprudence has for
the student. I should like to conclude with a word
or two about the benefits that jurisprudence has for
the law faculty itself. Law teaching is of course subject
to the same pressures of specialization, the same division of intellectual labor, which in this century has
transformed higher eucation and produced the modern university, with its atomized faculties and factorylike atmosphere. Although the process of specialization in law teaching has been slowed somewhat by the
fact that most law teachers share a common educational background, and by the resistance to substantive curricular change in American law schools, the
proliferation of complex statutes and the emergence
of entirely new branches of legal scholarship (such as
law and economics) have made it increasingly difficult
to appreciate, or even to assess, the value of work being done in a field other than one's own.
At Chicago this difficulty has so far proved not to be
a serious one. The relatively small size of the faculty
and the rather remarkable eagerness of its members
to keep abreast of one another's accomplishments
have preserved a wholeness of spirit and understanding that is striking.
And yet, even here, the risks of specialization can-

not be eliminated altogether. Foremost among these
risks is the danger that one may lose sight of the basic
assumptions and value-preferences on which work in
his specialty depends. Just as the fertility of a field requires that it be turned over regularly, the vitality of a
discipline demands that its philosophical underpinnings occasionally be exposed to view so that they
may be critically scrutinized. This is necessary if
others are to understand what the specialist is doing
and what his aims are. It is also necessary if the
specialist himself is to retain the breadth of vision he
needs to appreciate his place in the larger enterprise
of which he is a part.
Jurisprudence-and now I am talking not so much
about a course as about a mode of inquiry-provides a
forum in which many of these basic methodological
questions may be raised. It offers the specialist an opportunity to reflect on the foundations of his specialty
and to compare his premises and values with those of
his colleagues. In this way it helps him to combat the
terrible tendency of every specialized organization to
turn its members into the cogs of a machine. The simple questions that jurisprudence poses help us to remain masters of our own work rather than being
mastered by it. In this sense, jurisprudence has a
&
liberating influence.

I1REDGUN
(Continuedfrom page 21)
Most law schools have been reluctant to commit
themselves to any of these paths. The traditional
model has remained the dominant emphasis, but each
of the modern trends has been incoporated to some
degree without special emphasis on any one of them.

Here as elsewhere, the cumulation of people and
resources in specific directions may provide uniqueness and special distinction.
Spreading resources over too many approaches may
diminish the quality of each. Now is the time for law
faculties to face the issue of the direction of their
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schools' future. Can we obtain the resources to support
each of the directions of growth along with the traditional model? Which model or combination of
models, given our strengths and institutional setting,
offers the best vision for the future?
FACED WITH THE NEED TO CHANGE
These three trends-an emphasis on specialization
and research, an attempt to integrate other disciplines
and perspectives into the law curriculum and to connect the law school with the university and the introduction of clinical legal education-are the directions
of movement in modern legal education. The traditional Langdellian approach, however, with its emphasis on cognitive skills and case analysis, continues
to dominate student culture and course selections.
The modern trends have added to the interest and cost
of legal education, but the results have been limited
nearly everywhere by inadequate resources, student
apathy, faculty inertia and disagreement, and the
strong pull from the profession. The principal failure
of legal education is the inability to accomplish all of
these changes simultaneously.

Only a few schools have dared either to stick with
the traditional model in its undiluted form or to place
an emphasis on one or another of the three modern
trends: Antioch in clinical legal education and Chicago in legal research are two uncharacteristic examples
that come to mind. Most law schools have followed
the Harvard pattern of maintaining the traditional
framework while pursuing all three modern trends
simultaneously. It is doubtful whether any schools,
except perhaps Harvard, have resources that are sufficient to support adequate programs on all fronts.
The cautious approach to the future is to spread
resources over each of the alternative strategies rather
than to commit an institution to a single one. For a
prestige institution, this approach probably involves
less risk on the down side; but it also involves a reduced likelihood of really outstanding performance in
the years ahead.
If that is the goal, some product differentiation is
probably necessary, whether it be along the traditional model, the graduate and research institution
model, or the clinical legal education model.
&

BARR E
(Continuedfrom page 17)
enriched by the opening up of a vast new spectrum of
job opportunities for large, previously excluded
segments of the population. In this sense, the black
who is preferred as a teacher or a doctor or a pipefitter
is not being favored as an individual. It merely so happens that, at this moment in history, minorities are
endowed with qualities that must be distributed
throughout a wide range of positions in industry and
the professions if we are to solve one of our most pressing social problems. Such an approach may be profoundly at odds with our traditions of individual merit
and race neutrality, but I believe it accords with the
realities of the seventies.
Ultimately, the legitimacy of preferential treatment
for minorities should turn on a judicious appraisal of
the gains and losses for our society, and not on
abstract concepts like "color-blindness." Deliberate
race-based preferences are dangerous medicine,

justified only by the gravest circumstances, and they
must not be allowed to become habit-forming. There
is the obvious risk of estranging white ethnics, and indeed all groups who have good historical grounds for
abhorring any practice that smacks of racial quotas.
There is the further risk of perpetuating racial
stereotypes that must be purged even from our subconscious. Balanced against these risks is the certainty that an absolutist approach to color-blindness will
call a halt to the past decade's promising, if often
fumbling, efforts at integration in education and
employment.
Bakke presents the Supreme Court with a cruel
practical choice. It also presents the court with an opportunity to find a new dimension in the Fourteenth
Amendment, and to see that "equal protection" is not
a mathematician's table of equivalents, but a realist's
injunction to treat alike those who are, in this
remarkably diverse world, truly alike.
&,

SABBATICALS
(Continuedfrom page 27)
than 15 and to take a case that I had tried to conclusion so that I had all of the pleadings, fact memoranda, research memos and deposition transcripts. I
could prepare a fact sheet for each witness and have
faculty members act as witnesses. The students in
each seminar could be divided into two groups,
representing a plaintiffs firm and a defendant's firm.
Each "firm" would work on the case, beginning
with the first client interview and concluding with the
(non-jury) trial. The students would not see my
papers; they would do their own factual investigation,
research, memos, pleadings and discovery as though
they were handling an actual case for their respective
"law firms." Essentially, the students would be
treated as though they were associates in my own firm.

I would supervise their work, but they would have to
develop their own methods of research, writing and
interviewing.
My next step was to find a school. I wanted to teach
either in the southwest or the Pacific northwest, so I
searched through the AALS directory and wrote to 15
schools, setting forth my professional qualifications
and proposal for the course. Nearly all of the schools
responded, and most were interested in the course I
had outlined. A few were interested in having me
teach a conventional law school course. I eliminated
these from consideration.
After visiting several schools, and talking at length
with a number of others, I finally accepted an appointment as visiting professor from the University of
New Mexico Law School in Albuquerque. Albuquer-
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